ResumoO artigo busca inserir a obra Como nasce o novo no contexto mais largo da produção teórica de Marcos Nobre, formulando a partir daí três objeções. A primeira delas tenta deixar à mostra uma contradição entre a ideia de uma “atualização” da Fenomenologia do espírito e o par de conceitos de “diagnóstico” e “modelo” de Nobre. A segunda contesta a ideia de uma diferença radical entre o “projeto moderno” do Hegel autor da Fenomenologia e do autor da Enciclopédia, considerando, junto (...) do aspecto temporal da ideia de modernidade, também seu aspecto espacial. Por fim, a terceira questiona o caráter crítico da redução da ideia de fenomenologia em Nobre à ideia de uma “visadada subjetivação da dominação” e a tentativa de desvincular “reconstrução” e “intersubjetividade”. AbstractThe essay aims at inserting the book Como nasce o novo in the broader context of Marcos Nobre’s theoretical production, and then at formulating three objections. The first one tries to expose a contradiction between the idea of an “actualization” of the Phenomenology of Spirit and Nobre’s pair of concepts “diagnosis” and “model”. The second one contests the idea of a radical difference between the “project of modernity” of Hegel, the author of the Phenomenology, and Hegel, the author of the Encyclopedia, considering along the temporal aspect of the idea ofmodernity also its spatial aspect. Finally, the third one puts in question the critical character of the reduction of the idea of phenomenology to the idea of a “point of view of subjectivation of domination” and the attempt to detach “reconstruction” and “intersubjectivity” from each other. (shrink)

Throughout more than two millennia philosophers adhered massively to ideal standards of scientific rationality going back ultimately to Aristotle’s Analytica posteriora . These standards got progressively shaped by and adapted to new scientific needs and tendencies. Nevertheless, a core of conditions capturing the fundamentals of what a proper science should look like remained remarkably constant all along. Call this cluster of conditions the Classical Model of Science . In this paper we will do two things. First of all, we (...) will propose a general and systematized account of the Classical Model of Science. Secondly, we will offer an analysis of the philosophical significance of this model at different historical junctures by giving an overview of the connections it has had with a number of important topics. The latter include the analytic-synthetic distinction, the axiomatic method, the hierarchical order of sciences and the status of logic as a science. Our claim is that particularly fruitful insights are gained by seeing themes such as these against the background of the Classical Model of Science. In an appendix we deal with the historiographical background of this model by considering the systematizations of Aristotle’s theory of science offered by Heinrich Scholz, and in his footsteps by Evert W. Beth. (shrink)

En los reproches que José Ortega y Gasset le hace a Martin Heidegger sobre el problema del ser, al afirmar que este no puede ser un ciego punto de partida, una creencia, se evidencia la distancia entre dos perspectivas unidas por el horizonte real que pretenden explorar: la vida humana. Sin embargo,..

Antipathy is an affective phenomenon which has not received much attention by philosophers and psychologists, unlike its antonym, sympathy. However, antipathy is a phenomenon that contributes to and fuels many of the challenges related to our social behaviours and interpersonal relationships. Antipathy’s exact nature needs to be identified, if only because of the importance it has, for example, in political opposition, in loss of civility, but also in situations that cause poor psychological well-being. It would be then essential to be (...) able to determine whether antipathy is a phenomenon that could be felt on a short term (an episode) or last in the long term (a disposition), since it would allow to study and measure more precisely the nature of the acts it gives rise to, the range of its intensity or/and its social consequences. Like sympathy, antipathy is most often understood as an affective phenomenon that lasts over time. Antipathy is often presented as an instinctive and irrational aversion to something or someone. Yet this common definition is too similar to the definition of other affective phenomena such as disgust or even fear. This article will therefore examine the nature of antipathy by differentiating it from other emotional phenomena that resemble it. But more importantly, the limited existing literature on antipathy mostly characterises it as an affective disposition. In this paper, I will rather argue that antipathy is a conscious emotion, i.e., an emotion that occurs consciously and has a phenomenology. (shrink)

Segundo alguns intérpretes, Porfírio, no início de sua Isagoge, formula um problema que, “graças à Boécio, se tornará o principal problema lógico e metafísico da Idade Média ocidental”: a querela dos universais. Aqui pretendemos mostrar o quanto essas narrativas podem se afastar da compreensão que o próprio Boécio teve dos problemas propostos por Porfírio. Abstract:According to some interpreters, Porphyry introduces a dispute at the beginning of his Isagoge that, “thanks to Boethius, will become the main logical and metaphysical problem of (...) Western Middle Ages”: The Problem of Universals. This article aims to show what could be the distance from their views and Boethius’s own perspective on Porphyry’s arguments. (shrink)

It is argued, on the basis of new counterexamples, that neither knowledge nor epistemic justification (or “epistemic rationality”) can reasonably be thought to be closed under logical implication. The argument includes an attempt to reconcile the fundamental intuitions of the opposing parties in the debate.

O objetivo desse artigo será apresentar parte do debate atual sobre o papel da intenção na teoria da ação e na racionalidade prática. Para isso, iniciarei com a perspectiva do autor responsável pela retomada da filosofia da ação na contemporaneidade, Donald Davidson. Após oferecer uma breve exposição da concepção davidsoniana da intenção e da ação, e sobre os modelos teóricos “crença-desejo” e “crença-desejo-intenção” na filosofia da ação, pretendo desenvolver algumas considerações sobre o aspecto normativo da racionalidade prática (no sentido em (...) que envolve “razões para”) e o papel que a intenção tem nesse processo. Para isso, apresento o modo como Michael Bratman (1987) desenvolve uma linha de argumentação a favor de um tipo de função que a intenção pode desempenhar como input no raciocínio prático, argumentando em prol de um papel genuíno para a intenção em uma concepção de racionalidade prática. Por fim, apresento alguns desdobramentos da discussão sobre o modelo crença-desejo versus o modelo crença-desejo-intenção como propostas conflitantes para a explicação da racionalidade prática.AbstractThis paper aims to present part of the current debate about the role of intention in action theory and practical rationality. For this, I begin with the perspective of the philosopher responsible for the resumption of contemporary philosophy of action, Donald Davidson. After a brief exposition of davidsonian conception of intention and action, and of “belief-desire” and “belief-desire-intention” theoretical models in philosophy of action, I intend to develop some considerations about the normative aspect of practical rationality (in the sense that it involves “reasons for”) and the role of intention in that process. For this, I present the way that Michael Bratman (1987) develops a line of argumentation in favor of a certain type of role intention can play as input in practical reasoning, arguing for a genuine role for intention in a conception of practical rationality. Finally, I present some outspread on belief-desire versus belief-desire-intention discussion, as competing proposals for practical rationality explanation. (shrink)

En el artículo se plantea que la libertad de expresión es vulnerada de manera distinta a los escenarios tradicionales en razón del uso del Big Data y otras tecnologías como el análisis predictivo de datos y la personalización de contenido. Esta vulneración resulta diferente de la habitual puesto que no existe imposibilidad o limitación a expresar lo que se quiere de manera espontánea, sino que, la libertad de expresión se ve coartada ex ante a través de la generación de circunstancias (...) en las que lo que se expresa viene dado previamente a través de información adecuada de manera personalizada según el perfil de quien opina. Para lograr presentar esta tesis, se efectúa un marco de referencia en el que este fenómeno se contextualiza. Al final se realiza una propuesta para disminuir o eliminar esta vulneración a la libertad de expresión. (shrink)

An extension of intuitionism to empirical discourse, a project most seriously taken up by Dummett and Tennant, requires an empirical negation whose strength lies somewhere between classical negation (‘It is unwarranted that. . . ’) and intuitionistic negation (‘It is refutable that. . . ’). I put forward one plausible candidate that compares favorably to some others that have been propounded in the literature. A tableau calculus is presented and shown to be strongly complete.

The problem of rational prediction, launched by Wesley Salmon, is without doubt the Achilles heel of the critical method defended by Popper. In this paper, I assess the response given both by Popper and by the popperian Alan Musgrave to this problem. Both responses are inadequate and thus the conclusion of Salmon is reinforced: without appeal to induction, there is no way to make of the practical prediction a rational action. Furthermore, the critical method needs to be vindicated if one (...) pretends that its application is suitable for the preference of a hypothesis. I argue that the nature of this vindication is such that it may be applied also to induction. Thus, to be a popperian is a good reason also to be an inductivist. (shrink)

O presente artigo pretende examinar as linhas gerais da crítica de Condillac à metafísica, tentando indicar os elos entre sua recusa dos grandes sistemas do século XVII e sua concepção de linguagem. Para tanto, parte-se do Tratado dos sistemas, onde essa crítica é empreendida de maneira intensiva e detalhista, para se chegar à teoria dos signos linguísticos, apresentada pelo filósofo no Ensaio sobre a origem dos conhecimentos humanos e retomada em obras subsequentes. A tese fundamental aqui é a de que, (...) aos olhos do abade, se os grandes filósofos da metafísica clássica equivocaram-se ao fundarem seus sistemas em “máximas abstratas” e “suposições da imaginação”, foi por terem sido induzidos a erro devido à própria natureza dos signos linguísticos. Se essa hipótese de leitura estiver correta, tanto esse diagnóstico quanto a chave para solução do problema dependeriam do exame da origem e dos progressos da linguagem, realizado por Condillac no Ensaio.AbstractThis paper intends to examine the general lines of Condillac’s critique of metaphysics, trying to indicate the links between his refusal of the great systems of the seventeenth century and his conception of language. It begins with a short presentation of the Treatise of Systems, where this criticism is undertaken intensively and in detail, and aims to arrive at the theory of linguistic signs presented by the philosopher in the Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledges and resumed in subsequent works. The fundamental thesis here is that, to Condillac, if the great philosophers of classical metaphysics were wrong to base their systems on “abstract maxims” and “assumptions of the imagination,” it was because they were misled by their own nature of the linguistic signs. If this reading hypothesis is correct, both this diagnosis and the key to solving the problem would depend on his examination of the origin and progress of language presented to the reader in his Essay.Key words: Metaphysics; Empiricism; Signs; Language; History of language. (shrink)

Antipathy is an affective phenomenon which has not received much attention by philosophers and psychologists, unlike its antonym, sympathy. However, antipathy is a phenomenon that contributes to and fuels many of the challenges related to our social behaviours and interpersonal relationships. Antipathy’s exact nature needs to be identified, if only because of the importance it has, for example, in political opposition, in loss of civility, but also in situations that cause poor psychological well-being. It would be then essential to be (...) able to determine whether antipathy is a phenomenon that could be felt on a short term (an episode) or last in the long term (a disposition), since it would allow to study and measure more precisely the nature of the acts it gives rise to, the range of its intensity or/and its social consequences. Like sympathy, antipathy is most often understood as an affective phenomenon that lasts over time. Antipathy is often presented as an instinctive and irrational aversion to something or someone. Yet this common definition is too similar to the definition of other affective phenomena such as disgust or even fear. This article will therefore examine the nature of antipathy by differentiating it from other emotional phenomena that resemble it. But more importantly, the limited existing literature on antipathy mostly characterises it as an affective disposition. In this paper, I will rather argue that antipathy is a conscious emotion, i.e., an emotion that occurs consciously and has a phenomenology. (shrink)

The meaning of the term “analysis” in Leibniz’s work is multifarious and it is doubtful that one could ever succeed in gathering this variety of meanings into a unified whole. However it has long been remarked that a landmass seems to detach itself from these moving waters – an island sometimes called by its inventor “The Most General Analytics of Human Thoughts”. Already sketched in the De Arte Combinatoria (1666) as a reform of the “analytical part” of Logic (pars logices (...) analytica), it rested on a very simple intuition: the possibility of developing, in parallel, three analyses, namely an analysis of thoughts (analysis notionum et veritatum), an analysis of the structure of language by which we express these thoughts (analysis linguarum or analysis grammatica) and an analysis of the symbols by which we represent them (analysis characterum). This “General Analytics” achieved, any human thought could be related to a catalog of simple notions expressed by basic characters (the so called alphabetum cogitationum humanarum) and, as a direct consequence, any truth could be expressed as a combination of these primitive symbols. (shrink)

Resumo: Abordo, neste artigo, a forma pela qual o representacionismo perceptual compreende a tese da transparência, comprometendo-a, principalmente, com uma concepção indireta da experiência perceptual. Defendo, a partir de uma análise das perspectivas de Fred Dretske e Michael Tye, que é possível vincular-se representacionismo e a tese da transparência com uma concepção direta da experiência perceptual, cujo conteúdo é singular.Abstract: In this paper, I intend to review the way in which perceptive representationalism understands the thesis of transparency and its commitment (...) to an indirect conception of perception. From an analysis of the perspectives of Fred Dretske and Michael Tye, I argue for the possibility of relating representationism and the thesis of transparency to a direct conception of perception. (shrink)

No presente artigo proponho-me a reconstruir, o mais claramente possível o “paradoxo cético” a partir do modo como apresentado por Saul Kripke em seu Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982). Seu argumento sustenta que não há fatos ou razões que justifiquem nosso emprego de termos como dotados de significados. Para tanto, interponho as distinções que julgo pertinentes à adequada compreensão do tema, formulando os requisitos necessários à sua adequada resposta, a saber, o ontológico, o normativo e o da identificação (...) extensional no tempo. Ao final, contrasto o ceticismo ora objeto de análise com sua versão epistemológica clássica. AbstractIn the present paper I propose to rebuild as clearly as possible the “skeptical paradox” from the way presented by Saul Kripke in his Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982). His argument maintains that there are no facts or reasons justifying our use of terms as having meaning. Therefore, I interpose the distinctions that I consider relevant to the proper understanding of the subject and I formulate the requirements necessary for its proper response, namely the ontological, the normative and the extensional identification in time. Finally, I contrast semantic skepticism with its classical epistemological version. (shrink)

Resumo: O projeto semântico de Davidson toma a forma de reducionismo que visa explicar as noções intencionais com base em noções puramente extensionais. O objetivo desse trabalho consiste na investigação do fracasso do projeto de Davidson como um argumento indireto contra sua suposição segundo a qual a chamada interpretação radical seria o fundamento do significado linguístico e do pensamento. Abstract: Davidson's semantic program is a form of semantic reductionism that aims to account for intensional notions on a purely extensional basis. (...) My aim in this paper is not to show that Davidsons fails in addressing the so-called extensionality problem. That is no novelty. Even Davidsonians recognize Davidson's failure. My main goal is to explore Davidson's failure as an indirect argument against his key assumption that the radical interpretation is the basis of sense and hence the possibility of thought. There is no priority of language over thought. This is a remnant of the so-called linguistic turn that Davidson inherited from the analytical tradition. The moral is the following: we must come back to Lockean common sense that to learn a natural language and to translate an alien tongue into our own is merely to learn a vehicle for communicating and expressing thoughts we have already had. (shrink)

In this paper, I present a new reading of transcendental idealism. For a start, I endorse Allison’s rejection of the traditional so-called two-world view and, hence, of Guyer and Van Cleve’s ontological phenomenalism. But following Allais, I also reject Allison’s metaphysical deflacionism: transcendental idealism is metaphysically committed to the existence of things in themselves, noumena in the negative sense. Nevertheless, in opposition to Allais, I take Kant’s claim that appearances are “mere representations” inside our minds seriously. In the empirical sense, (...) appearances are the undetermined object of our sensible intuition. Yet, in the transcendental sense, appearances are nothing but the mind-dependent way that noumena manifest inside our minds and, hence, our mind-dependent way of knowing the mind-independent reality in itself (epistemological phenomenalism). (shrink)

In this paper we advocate the thesis that qualia are tropes (or qualitons), and not (universal) properties. The main advantage of the thesis is that we can accept both the Wittgensteinian and Sellarsian assault on the given and the claim that only subjective and private states can do justice to the qualitative character of experience. We hint that if we take qualia to be tropes, we dissolve the problem of inverted qualia. We develop an account of sensory concept acquisition that (...) takes the presence of qualia as an enabling condition for learning. We argue that qualia taken to be qualitons are part of our mechanism of sensory concept acquisition. (shrink)

"Jede Unterweisung und jedes verständige Erwerben von Wissen entsteht aus bereits vorhandener Kenntnis", beginnt Aristoteles seinen Text und entwickelt seine Lehre vom wissenschaftlichen Beweis, d. h. vom apodiktischen Schluss. Er deckt die Grundprinzipien der Erkenntnis auf, damit ein deduktivisch-wissenschaftliches Wissen möglich wird. Außer einer Präzisierung dieser Lehre unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Wahrheitsfindung werden auch Regeln für die sachgemäße Aufstellung von Definitionen unterbreitet - ein fundamentaler Beitrag zur Entstehung des Wissenschaftsbegriffs. Die Zweite Analytik des Aristoteles ist seit der Spätantike so kontinuierlich (...) wie kaum eine andere philosophische Schrift diskutiert und ausgelegt worden. (shrink)

Neste trabalho, pretende-se analisar o que se quer dizer com “falácia naturalista” e saber se há bons argumentos para sustentarmos a existência de uma falácia desse tipo. Começaremos estudando o que Hume falou sobre o assunto; se realmente ele enunciou algo como uma “Lei” contra derivar um “dever-ser” de um “ser”. Depois da obra de Hume, passaremos à de Moore. Na obra de Moore, veremos se ele quer dizer com o termo o mesmo que dizemos atualmente. Analisadas as obras dos (...) dois autores, passaremos, por último, a estudar o que “falácia naturalista” e “derivar um dever-ser de um ser” quer dizer hoje. Concluiremos que não há bons argumentos para aceitarmos que o que esses termos denotam é de fato uma falácia. Abstract:In this work, our aim is to investigate the meaning of the term “naturalistic fallacy”, and if there are good arguments to sustain the existence of a fallacy of this kind. We will begin studying what Hume said about the matter; if he really enunciated something like a “Law” against deriving a “is” from a “ought”. In the next section, we will proceed to the the arguments brought by Moore, to see whether the meaning of term is the same for him and us. Having analyzed the works of the two authors, we will proceed, in the final section, to study what the terms “naturalistic fallacy” and “deriving an ought from an is” means today. Finally, we will conclude that there aren’t good arguments for us to accept that what these terms denote is in fact a fallacy. (shrink)

Our goal in this paper is to discuss the notion of animal knowledge in Judgment and Agency. Our approach has two stages. First, we offer a positive contribution, attempting to show that there is room for the introduction of emotions into an animal knowledge approach and into Sosa’s theory of competence. If we follow Sosa and conceive knowledge as a kind of action or successful performance, then emotions can contribute functionally for enhancing performance and are essential for the sharing of (...) knowledge among social agents. Second, we offer criticism of Sosa’s integrative project. It’s not clear that reflective knowledge always improves animal knowledge; rather, in order to avoid regress, Sosa should recognize that we can have perfectly safe animal knowledge. Finally, we argue that reflective knowledge has a more marginal role than Sosa seems at first sight to suggest. (shrink)

'De syllogismis' is the fifth treatise of John Buridan's 'Summulae dialecticae', a textbook he wrote for his logic course in the Faculty of Arts at the University of Paris. 'De syllogismis' contains material related to Aristotle's Analytica Priora and Boethius's 'De hypotheticis syllogismis'. The textbook discusses inferences involving not only propositions de inesse, but also propositions featuring oblique, reduplicative and infinite terms. Buridan displays a keen interest in modal inferences and inferences involving propositional attitudes. Buridan's De syllogismis continues along (...) the lines of his nominalist conception of the relations between mind, language and reality. (shrink)

Die "Zweite Analytik" ("Analytica Posteriora"), enstanden im 4. Jhdt. v. Chr.,gehört zu den esoterischen Schriften des Aristoteles und präsentiert seine Wissenschaftstheorie, die eine Theorie des Wissens einschließt. Untersucht wird hier die Frage, was Wissenschaft sei und wie sie möglich werde. Von zentraler Bedeutung ist für Aristoteles die These vom Vorrang der Sinneswahrnehmung, die der Entstehung des Wissens vorausgeht: Jede Unterweisung und jedes verständige Erwerben von Wissen entsteht aus bereits vorhandener Kenntnis - aber nach klaren und ausweisbaren Regeln. Die so (...) bestimmte Wissenschaft gliedert sich dann in zwei einander ergänzende Teile. Der eine ist die deduktive Ableitung von Aussagen aus evidenten, ohne weiteren Beweis einleuchtenden Sätzen, die bis in die heutige Zeit als Inbegriff strenger Wissenschaft gilt, der andere die Prinzipienerkenntnis, d.h. die methodisch gewonnene Einsicht in den Kanon und die Geltungskraft der ersten Sätze aller Wissenschaft. Unter einem Beweis, also einer Aussage aus Prinzipien, versteht Aristoteles eine Erkenntnis, die, ausgehend von der Wahrnehmung, Erinnerung und Erfahrung im analytischen Urteil, durch Abstraktion das Allgemeine am Besonderen ermittelt und heraushebt. Die zweisprachige Studienausgabe bietet den deutschen Text in einer revidierten Fassung der vom Herausgeber 1993 in der Berliner Akademie-Ausgabe vorgelegten Übersetzung; der beigegebene griechische Text folgt der Edition von W. R. Ross, Oxford 1964. Die Einleitung führt in die Grundlagen der aristotelischen Wissenschaftstheorie ein, so wie sie in der "Zweiten Analytik "ausgearbeitet wird. (shrink)

Les affaires de Facebook et de Cambridge Analytica ont révélé aux démocraties la toute-puissance de la manipulation algorithmique. Les IA influencent dorénavant de manière drastique jusqu’au sacro-saint scrutin majoritaire. En ciblant nos affects et les failles de notre jugement, les IA attisent la tyrannie de la majorité. Sommes-nous pour autant condamnés à voir un choix individuel peu assuré dissout dans un choix collectif douteux? Pour initier une réponse réjouissante qui redonnerait tout son sens au vote, l’article propose de revoir (...) non sans dérision les règles du jeu : Et si les capacités de simulation des IA, au lieu de nous berner, nous aidaient au contraire dans notre jugement de citoyen? Et si, en dégourdissant la pensée humaine plutôt qu’en la numérisant au moyen de l’IA, la simulation d’un candidat artificiel éveillait une intelligence collective permettant de prémunir les citoyens contre la tyrannie des moyennes? (shrink)

Sobre esta edição A terceira edição de A Semântica transcendental de Kant (Campinas, CLE, 2005) encontra-se esgotada há vários anos. Este fato recomenda a sua reedição, tendo em vista o interesse que as edições anteriores suscitaram na comunidade kantiana brasileira. Desde a primeira edição em 2000, dediquei numerosos artigos e resenhas – publicados nas revistas Analytica, Cadernos de História e Filosofia da Ciência, Manuscrito, O que nos faz pensar e Studia Kantiana, entre outras – foram dedicados à apresentação e (...) divulgação de pesquisas, bem como aos debates, sobre o lugar da semântica transcendental na obra de Kant. Sobre a coleção Zeljko Loparic: Obras Reunidas A idade pede que se olhe para o passado, o caminho percorrido e as realizações. Minhas Obras reunidas são uma tentativa de fazer tal balanço. Elas conterão a totalidade de minha produção intelectual no campo da filosofia publicada entre 1975 e 2022. Os trabalhos serão agrupados em seis partes temáticas e ordenados cronologicamente, seguindo as principais linhas de desenvolvimento da minha compreensão das perguntas filosóficas ao longo dos anos. Uma sétima parte conterá traduções de minha produção para outras línguas. Os volumes de cada parte terão títulos refletindo sua fonte de inspiração ou seu conteúdo, o que será esboçado em prefácios. Os escritos desse período ainda inéditos serão a disponibilizados online via streaming na Coleção Inéditos Loparic. (shrink)

Cet article examine la définition, par Ramus, des normes de chaque science et l’influence de la critique de ce modèle ramiste dans l’émergence, au tournant du XVIIe siècle, d’une vision de la philosophie comme système de toutes les sciences. En étudiant la manière dont Bartholomäus Keckermann décrit les conditions qui permettent d’envisager la philosophie comme système des systèmes, on remarque la nette diffraction de l’héritage aristotélicien (principalement les Analytica posteriora) dans les thèses ramistes d’une part, dans l’approche systématique de (...) Keckermann par rapport aux disciplines philosophiques d’autre part. Cette différence a eu un fort impact sur les fonctions attribuées à la logique (Ramus) et à la métaphysique (Keckermann) dans l’architecture des savoirs. (shrink)

Analiso neste artigo a presença na cosmologia de Tomás de Aquino da hipótese real do vacuum in natura afirmada no contexto da discussão sobre a geração e os primeiros instantes da locomoção natural dos corpos simples sublunares. Para tanto, o texto possui três partes. Primeiro, mostro porque o vaccuum in natura é uma discussão pertencente ao domínio da cosmologia entendida como matriz disciplinar cujo objeto é o cosmo enquanto conjunto dos corpos simples. Na segunda parte, por sua vez, apresento a (...) discussão geral sobre a noção de vazio que Tomás estabelece com Aristóteles. Enfim, na terceira parte, exponho, por um lado, a crítica de Tomás à tese de Averróis segundo a qual a resistência é necessária para a locomoção natural e, por outro lado, a hipótese tomista baseada nas noções de generans e vis sobre a locomoção natural e finita no vazio. Abstract:In this article I analyze the presence in the cosmology of Thomas Aquinas of the real hypothesis of the vacuum in natura affirmed in the context of the discussion about the generation and the first instants of the natural locomotion of the sublunary simple bodies. To do so, the text has three parts. Firstly I show why the vaccuum in natura is a discussion belonging to the domain of cosmology understood as a disciplinary matrix whose object is the cosmos as a set of simple bodies. In the second part, I present the general discussion of the notion of void that Aquinas establishes with Aristotle. Finally, in the third part, I present, on the one hand, Aquinas’s critique of Averroes’ thesis that resistance is necessary for natural locomotion and, on the other hand, the Thomistic hypothesis based on the notions of generans and vis on locomotion natural and finite in the void. (shrink)

Inspirado na tese segundo a qual a revolução cartesiana inaugura de modo irreversível um tempo da ciência, Beyssade compara a formação do pensamento em duas histórias de vida paralelas: a de Rousseau, quando o escritor genebrino estabelece os princípios de sua filosofia, e a do próprio Beyssade, quando este revisa a interpretação da obra de Rousseau que aprendera com seu mestre Robert Derathé.

Este artículo se centra en el análisis del uso de la industria del big data en la política. Se examina de forma pormenorizada el caso de la empresa Cambridge Analytica y se profundiza en los efectos del uso de la tecnología del big data en el referéndum de permanencia de Reino Unido en la Unión Europea y en las elecciones presidenciales estadounidenses de 2016. El objetivo es exponer los efectos nocivos que tiene el uso de la tecnología del big (...) data en los procesos electorales y los daños que esta tecnología puede producir en los sistemas democráticos. (shrink)

Resenha do livro The story of my life: narrative and self-understanding, de Richard Moran, por César Schirmer dos Santos.

In this paper, I discuss a view of de re thoughts that can be naturally endorsed in the wake of Russell's account. This is the view that a thought is about the very thing (res) rather than a mere characterization of it if and only if it is constitutively tied, if not to the existence, at least to the identity of its object and the thinker knows which/who the object of his/her thought is. Faced with the challenge of accommodating far (...) from uncommon cases of mistaken identity or substantial confusion on the part of the subject, I argue that the integrity of the view can be preserved and that the restrictions set on its truth by the advocates of the two-component picture and the anti-essentialists can be lifted. (shrink)

Trata-se neste artigo de comparar o lugar do estado de guerra nas formulações do pacto social no SegundoDiscurso e no Contrato social. O autor examina o deslocamento teórico operado por Rousseau no tocante ao estado de guerra e suas condições de possibilidade, começando com o quadro das relações entre indivíduos até chegar ao das relações entre corpos políticos.